Detecting Large Concept Extensions for Conceptual Analysis

When performing a conceptual analysis of a concept, philosophers are interested in all forms of expression of a concept in a text---be it direct or indirect, explicit or implicit. In this paper, we experiment with topic-based methods of automating the detection of concept expressions in order to facilitate philosophical conceptual analysis. We propose six methods based on LDA, and evaluate them on a new corpus of court decision that we had annotated by experts and non-experts. Our results indicate that these methods can yield important improvements over the keyword heuristic, which is often used as a concept detection heuristic in many contexts. While more work remains to be done, this indicates that detecting concepts through topics can serve as a general-purpose method for at least some forms of concept expression that are not captured using naive keyword approaches

Consciousness: the last 50 years(and the next)

The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern. But for much of the 20th century, ideological and methodological concerns relegated its empirical study to the margins. Since the 1990s, studying consciousness has regained a legitimacy and momentum befitting its status as the primary feature of our mental lives. Nowadays, consciousness science encompasses a rich interdisciplinary mixture drawing together philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience its central discipline. Researchers have learned a great deal about the neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress will depend on specifying closer explanatory mappings between (first-person subjective) phenomenological descriptions and (third-person objective) descriptions of (embodied and embedded) neuronal mechanisms. Such progress will help reframe our understanding of our place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to a wide range of psychiatric and neurological disorders

Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem

According to David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists of explaining how and why qualitative experience arises from physical states. Moreover, Chalmers argues that materialist and reductive explanations of mentality are incapable of addressing the hard problem. In this chapter, I suggest that Chalmers’ hard problem can be usefully distinguished into a ‘how question’ and ‘why question,’ and I argue that evolutionary biology has the resources to address the question of why qualitative experience arises from brain states. From this perspective, I discuss the different kinds of evolutionary explanations (e.g., adaptationist, exaptationist, spandrel) that can explain the origins of the qualitative aspects of various conscious states. This argument is intended to clarify which parts of Chalmers’ hard problem are amenable to scientific analysis

Computation in Physical Systems: A Normative Mapping Account

The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes and pragmatic goals. Hence there is no independent or uniform fact to the matter, and I advance the ‘anti-realist’ conclusion that computational descriptions of physical systems are not founded upon deep ontological distinctions, but rather upon interest-relative human conventions. Hence physical computation is a ‘conventional’ rather than a ‘natural’ kind

The Real Combination Problem : Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence

Panpsychism harbors an unresolved tension, the seriousness of which has yet to be fully appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer panpsychists advice on how to resolve it. The dilemma, briefly, is as follows. Panpsychists are committed to the perspicuous explanation of macro-mentality in terms of micro-mentality. But panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature not just mental properties, but also micro-subjects to whom these properties belong. Yet it is impossible to explain the constitution of a macro-subject (like one of us) in terms of the assembly of micro-subjects, for, I show, subjects cannot combine. Therefore the panpsychist explanatory project is derailed by the insistence that the world’s ultimate material constituents (ultimates) are subjects of experience. The panpsychist faces a choice of abandoning her explanatory project, or recanting the claim that the ultimates are subjects. This is the dilemma. I argue that the latter option is to be preferred. This needn’t constitute a wholesale abandonment of panpsychism, however, since panpsychists can maintain that the ultimates possess phenomenal qualities, despite not being subjects of those qualities. This proposal requires us to make sense of phenomenal qualities existing independently of experiencing subjects, a challenge I tackle in the penultimate section. The position eventually reached is a form of neutral monism, so another way to express the overall argument is to say that, keeping true to their philosophical motivations, panpsychists should really be neutral monists.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Opinions of dentists and directors of nursing concerning dental care provision for Adelaide nursing homes

The document attached has been archived with permission from the Australian Dental Association (7th Jan 2007). An external link to the publisher’s copy is included.Background: The complex oral health problems of nursing home residents have been well documented. However, the influences on residents’ oral health status, including opinions and experiences of dental professionals and nursing home staff, have not yet been adequately investigated. Methods: The baseline questionnaire component of this longitudinal study was mailed to all registered dentists practising in Adelaide and Adelaide nursing home directors of nursing (DONs). Results: 413 dentists and 97 DONs indicated that Adelaide dentists’ interest and training in nursing home dentistry was low. Dental service provision for nursing home residents was very low and dentists preferred to provide treatment at their dental practices. Few dental hygienists were working in nursing homes and dental professionals provided little educational assistance for nursing home staff. Dentists and DONs held several common and many varying perceptions of the problems associated with dental care provision in nursing homes. Both identified a group of nursing home environmental constraints and a lack of portable dental equipment. DONs further identified a group of resident related problems, and dentists a group of dental practicerelated problems. Conclusions: These study results provide important information concerning problems with nursing home dentistry for dental service providers, educators, policy-makers, administrators and nursing home staff.JM Chalmers, C Hodge, JM Fuss, AJ Spencer, KD Carter and R Mathe

The "Artificial Mathematician" Objection: Exploring the (Im)possibility of Automating Mathematical Understanding

Reuben Hersh confided to us that, about forty years ago, the late Paul Cohen predicted to him that at some unspecified point in the future, mathematicians would be replaced by computers. Rather than focus on computers replacing mathematicians, however, our aim is to consider the (im)possibility of human mathematicians being joined by “artificial mathematicians” in the proving practice—not just as a method of inquiry but as a fellow inquirer

Personhood, consciousness, and god : how to be a proper pantheist

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing the universe as a person. If successful, it removes one bar to endorsing pantheism. I do this by examining a rising school of thought on personhood, on which persons, or selves, are understood as identical to episodes of consciousness. Through a critique of this experiential approach to personhood, I develop a theory of self as constituted of qualitative mental contents, but where these contents are also capable of unconscious existence. On this theory, though we can be conscious of our selves, consciousness turns out to be inessential to personhood. This move, I then argue, provides resources for responding to the pantheist’s problem of God’s person.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio